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the topic, that “Nobody puts their membership in Alcoholics 
Anonymous on their CV.”3 Surely we ought to say that if 
anything demonstrates integrity, it would be admitting 
a difficult truth about oneself and seeking support with 
others through a frank relationship of self-disclosure, 
making the AA example particularly apt, not least since the 
“anonymous” part of AA recognizes that this sort of integrity 
requires a safe separation of this organizational identity 
from other aspects of one’s life, of which the contents of a 
CV is only one particular example, dramatic in its absurdity.
Zuckerberg, for his part, seems to have started to think 
differently about this, stating in a 2014 interview that
I don’t know if the balance has swung too far, but 
I definitely think we’re at the point where we don’t 
need to keep on only doing real identity things 
[. . .] If you’re always under the pressure of real 
identity, I think that is somewhat of a burden.4
The 2010 comments are still important for us to take 
seriously, though. Not so much because Zuckerberg’s 
comments reveal a design trait in the Facebook platform 
that has changed how we think about and perform identity 
(although this is interesting as well!). But even more so 
because if Zuckerberg, mired as he is in thinking about 
how people manage self- and group identities, can fall into 
a way of thinking so disconnected from the actual conduct 
of lives, there must be something deeply intuitive, perhaps 
seductive, about this way of thinking about integrity.
At the heart of this intuition is a modern individualist 
notion of the self—the self which rights-bearing, with an 
individual and separable existence; the juridical self. We 
must assume an integral self logically prior to organizational 
and communal entanglement in order to pass judgment 
on whether it is limited, transformed, disfigured, hidden, 
or altered by its entrance into and representation within 
groups and contexts. We tend to take on a “correspondence 
theory” of integrity, parallel to the correspondence theory 
of truth, in which a self-representation is to have greater 
or lesser integrity depending upon the degree of similarity 
that it bears to some a priori “true” self. This view of an 
“unencumbered self” is deeply mistaken as Sandel (1984) 
among others has pointed out, but is logistically central to 
our liberal individualist conception of rights and community 
and thus hard to avoid falling into. Zuckerberg may do well 
to read philosophy in addition to the remedial Goffman 
(1959) to which Zimmer rightly wishes to assign him.
INTEGRITY AND SELF-PERFORMANCE
Turning to philosophical theories of personal identity seems 
at first unhelpful. Whether, for example, we adopt a body-
continuity or mind-continuity theory of identity has only the 
slightest relevance to what might count as “integrity”—in 
fact, it seems any perspective on philosophical personal 
identity must view “integrity” as either non-optional or 
impossible; more a metaphysical state than a moral value. 
But even within, e.g., the Humean view that the self is no 
more than a theater stage on which impressions appear 
in succession5 fails to preclude that there may be some 
integral self—Hume’s claim applies only to the self as 
revealed by introspection, as Kant pointed out in arguing 
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In an age of social media we are confronted with a problem 
novel in degree if not in kind: being called to account for 
the differences between presentations of self appropriate 
within a variety of group contexts. Business news in the 
post-Facebook era has been replete with stories about 
privacy fails, large and small—employees fired or denied 
promotion seemingly due to same-sex relationships 
revealed on social media, career advice to college students 
about destroying online evidence of having done normal 
college-student things, and so on. Keeping work and 
private lives separate has become more difficult, and 
difficult in different ways, and we are living in a new era of 
navigating self- and group-identities.
While social media in general tends to create these 
problems, Facebook, with its unitary profile, single Friend 
list, and real-name policy, has been central to creating this 
new hazardous environment for identity performance. Mark 
Zuckerberg is quoted in an interview with David Kirkpatrick 
saying, “You have one identity. . . . The days of you having 
a different image for your work friends or co-workers and 
for the other people you know are probably coming to an 
end pretty quickly. . . . Having two identities for yourself is 
an example of a lack of integrity.”1 Many have critiqued this 
simplistic view of identity, but Michael Zimmer’s widely 
read blog post on the topic is particularly pithy and direct:
Zuckerberg must have skipped that class 
where Jung and Goffman were discussed. 
Individuals are constantly managing and restricting 
flows of information based on the context they 
are in, switching between identities and persona. 
I present myself differently when I’m lecturing in 
the classroom compared to when I’m having a beer 
with friends. I might present a slightly different 
identity when I’m at a church meeting compared 
to when I’m at a football game. This is how we 
navigate the multiple and increasingly complex 
spheres of our lives. It is not that you pretend 
to be someone that you are not; rather, you turn 
the volume up on some aspects of your identity, 
and tone down others, all based on the particular 
context you find yourself.2
And this view of the complexity of managing self-
presentations within different organizational contexts, 
destructive as it already is to Zuckerberg’s—well, it’s hard 
to say . . . simplistic? Naïve? Unrealistic? Hetero- and Cis-
privileged? Judgmental? All of these, I suppose—at any 
rate, to Zuckerberg’s faulty view of multiple identities as 
“a lack of integrity,” this view doesn’t even yet consider 
that different elements of identity may need to be not 
merely emphasized or toned down in different contexts, 
but that integral aspects of identity may need to be hidden 
entirely in some contexts and revealed only in others. 
Zimmer is aware of this too, and quotes an appropriately 
pseudonymous comment on Kieran Healy’s blog post on 
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the self that we recognize as ourselves, and inhibitions may 
themselves be the product of choice and work.
INTEGRITY IN AN ORGANIZATIONAL CONTEXT
We need not fall into a correspondence theory of integrity or 
adopt a liberal individualist conception of the self in order 
to recognize that organizational contexts present problems 
for personal integrity. Two primary sorts come immediately 
to mind: (1) that organizational contexts may exert 
influences rendering it more difficult to act with integrity, as 
in familiar cases such as conformity and groupthink; and (2) 
that organizational contexts may contain hostility towards 
certain self-identifications, making self-performance with 
integrity dangerous. The second kind of problem is the sort 
most obviously presented by social media in novel ways, 
and will be our focus here, but by the end of this chapter 
we’ll have some insights on the first as well.
Conflicts between aspects of self-identity in different 
contexts certainly do not arise for the first time with 
social media, and are not limited to identities which are 
discriminated against. One does not, for the most part, 
discuss one’s sex life in church, even if that sex life takes 
place within marriage—and within a straight marriage, and 
involves “vanilla sex” rather than BDSM, and so on. And yet 
it is not without reason that recent years have seen renewed 
and intensified discussion of managing boundaries 
between personal and professional life, and the tendency 
of social media to either blur or overlap contexts of identity 
performance has created a new environment of identity 
performance causing new requirements for thinking about 
and managing identities.10
In contemporary digital environments, we are frequently 
interacting simultaneously with persons from different 
personal and social contexts. Our friends and followers in 
social networking sites (SNS) are promiscuously intermixed. 
We have only a single profile in each, and we cannot 
choose which profile items—gender identity, religious 
identity, former employers, name—are viewable to which 
connections or groups of connections in our network. 
Nor can we choose to have different presentations for 
different connections or groups: we may portray ourselves 
differently in social or work contexts, but can choose only 
a single profile picture. There are work-arounds, of course, 
but they are onerous, difficult to maintain, and sometimes 
violate terms of service agreements requiring single 
accounts and real names. Even using built-in affordances 
intended to aid in maintaining contextual integrity,11 such as 
private accounts (Twitter), friend lists (Facebook), or circles 
(Google+), is difficult and socially risky: difficult because 
managing such affordances requires significant upkeep, 
curation, memory, and attention; risky because members 
of groups of which we are members tend to have their 
own separate interconnections, online or off, and effective 
boundary enforcement must include knowledge of these 
interconnections and accurate prediction of information 
flows across them. If you wish to convince your parents that 
you’ve quit Facebook, how far out in their social networks 
must you go in excluding friends from viewing your posts? 
Aunts and uncles? Family friends? Friends of friends of 
family? Or, in maintaining separation of work and personal 
life, how are you to know whether a Facebook friend or 
for the idealism of the transcendental unity of apperception 
(1998); a grammatical necessity, as it were, corresponding in 
unknowable ways to the noumenal reality, which, however, 
is not necessarily less real for its unknowability. Indeed, 
when we look to Hume’s (2012) theory of moral virtue, we 
see it is based upon sentiment and sympathy rather than 
following moral rules or calculation, implying that we have 
these acquired and habitual attributes which constitute our 
moral selves, even if they are not the “I” of the “I think” 
which accompanies all representations. Even reductive and 
skeptical positions within philosophical theories of personal 
identity make room for habit, character, and some sort of 
content to the self, inaccessible through introspection 
though it might be, which is subject to change and growth, 
and which is if not an origin then at least a conditioning 
factor in the determination of our thought and action.
We could do worse than to turn to Aristotle for an account 
of this.6 An Aristotelian view of character has the significant 
virtue of viewing identity as both real and consequential as 
well as also being an object of work. We have on his view a 
determinate character—e.g., we may, in fact, be a coward. 
But in this view we still need not fall into Sartrean bad faith, 
for a coward need not be a coward in the sense that Sartre’s 
waiter is a waiter.7 A coward may be a coward, but may 
nevertheless be brave in this or that particular situation—
and through an accretion of such instances of bravery, may 
become brave rather than cowardly. Aristotle, along with 
AA, tells us to “fake it ‘til you make it,” and both rightly 
view this “faking it” as a creation of integrity, not a mere 
demonstration of its absence.
On a correspondence theory of integrity, this self-conscious 
performance of a character which we do not possess 
appears as false representation, but this makes sense 
only when we assume a complete, settled, and coherent 
character. We say someone is “acting with integrity” when 
she takes an action in accordance with her values and 
principles, even or especially when it goes against her self-
interest. Integrity, then, is not a degree of correspondence 
between character and behavior, but between values 
and behavior. One can even act with integrity by going 
against one’s character, as in the case of the coward who 
nonetheless stands up for what she believes in a dangerous 
situation; the alcoholic entering recovery who affirms “I am 
intemperate” and concludes “therefore I will not drink.”8
The sort of identity relevant to integrity, then, is not personal 
identity in a philosophical sense (for the mere unity of 
apperception is not a thing to which I can stay true), nor is 
it one’s actual character or habits (for to reduce oneself to 
one’s history and habits is bad faith, and acting according 
to our habits could well lead us away from integrity if our 
habits are vicious). Instead, the relevant sort of identity must 
be that with which we identify. Certainly we can recognize 
that we have traits with which we do not identify, and the 
process of personal growth is the process of changing 
our character in order to bring it into accordance with the 
values we identify with. As Suler has argued, disinhibition 
does not necessarily reveal some “truer self” that lies 
“underneath” inhibitions; disinhibition may instead make 
us unrecognizable to ourselves.9 Our inhibitions—at the 
least the ones we value; which we identify with—are part of 
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conversations take place within overlapping contexts. A 
public post absent identity markers, a popular music video, 
for example, may receive a simple comment from an “in-
group” friend (e.g., “Too bad she’s straight!”), and through 
such interactions a potentially sensitive social context may 
coalesce around all those participants and passive viewers 
present—and all this without the “in-group” friend having 
any cues that she has broken down a silo. How are we to 
know which of a friend’s user-defined groups we are in, 
and how they are organized?
These effects are related to prior theorizations of Meyrowitz’s 
“middle region,” Papacharissi’s “publicly private and 
privately public spaces,” and Marwick and boyd’s “context 
collapse.”13 What is perhaps most distinctive about this 
particular case is the way these identity performances are 
tied to unitary SNS profiles and take place within shifting 
and interlocking publicities rather than across a public/
private divide. We are not seeing the private leaking out into 
the public so much as we are seeing a variety of regional 
publics overlaid upon one another. In this, we are called 
to account for our contextual identities in a new way: our 
selves are displayed, through both our actions as well as 
through others’ interactions with us, simultaneously before 
a multiplicity of audience with which we may identify in 
different ways.
This is the most peculiar challenge to integrity in an age 
of social media: we can no longer work out our own idea 
of how our values and commitments can harmonize into 
an integral self. Siloed identity performances allow us 
to perform those aspects of our identity, understood as 
that version of ourselves with which we identify, which 
fit within one context and another context, variously and 
in sequence. We can be gay in one context, Muslim in 
another, and a soldier in another still, and whether and to 
what extent those identities can be integrated can largely 
be sequestered as an issue for our own moral introspection 
and self-labor. Once these identities must be performed 
before a promiscuously intermixed set of audiences, 
integrity in the sense of staying true to our values takes on 
a newfound publicity, for we can no longer gain acceptance 
within groups merely by maintaining the local expectations 
for values and behaviors within each group in turn, but 
instead must either (1) meet each and all local expectations 
globally, (2) argue before others for the coherence of these 
identities when they vary from expectations particular 
to each group with which we identify, or (3) rebuild and 
maintain silos where time, space, and context no longer 
create them.
Indeed, so striking is this change that some have worried 
whether we are losing our interiority altogether.
INTEGRITY AND THE “ORGANIZATION MAN”
The worry that maintaining multiple profiles, and with them 
multiple selves, reflects a lack of integrity is a Scylla in the 
anxieties of popular discourse about SNS to which there 
is a corresponding Charybdis: the fear that an emerging 
“let it all hang out” social norm will destroy the private self 
altogether, and ring in a new age of conformity, where all 
aspects of our lives become performances before (and by 
implication for) others.
Twitter follower might know someone in your office well 
enough to mention that “Oh, I know a co-worker of yours! 
Sounds like you have some serious HR issues . . .” Social 
media is indeed connecting us more than ever before, but 
there are many significant silos the structural integrity of 
which we wish to maintain.
These social silos were previously maintained not only by 
non-simultanous interactions with different groups and 
organizational contexts, but also by the mundane barriers 
of time and space, missing in digital and especially in SNS 
environments. In our offline lives, when one is in church 
one is not also simultaneously in the office, in one’s tennis 
partner’s car on a family vacation, in one’s adult children’s 
living rooms—and, similarly, when one is out on the town, it 
is not also simultaneously the morning after, next Monday 
at lunch break, and five years later while interviewing for a 
new position. Digital media do not limit information flows 
through time and space the same ways as do physically 
based interactions, and our ability to predict to where 
information may flow and how it may matter to others and 
in other contexts—and to project that prediction indefinitely 
into the future and in relation to concerns which our future 
selves may have—is obviously insufficient to inoculate 
ourselves against the “privacy virus” that SNS presents.12 
Worse still, in the absence of these mundane architectural 
barriers of time and space, and the social barriers to which 
they give rise, even our most thoughtful connections may 
not be able to accurately perceive and maintain the limits 
on information flows which we seek to maintain.
The co-worker who we run into at the gay bar, regardless of 
his sexual orientation, must have overcome potential social 
barriers by being sufficiently comfortable with presence in a 
context and location where a sexualized same-gender gaze 
is considered normal and proper rather than deviant. Given 
these mundane conditions, those who may bump into a 
co-worker at the gay bar—whether they be taking part in a 
community of common self-identification, or whether they 
be gay-friendly straights who are there to see a drag show, 
or because it’s just the best place in town to go dancing—
can at least know that the other party has similarly passed 
through these social filters. Although it may not be known 
by either party what has brought the other there, both are 
“insiders” insofar as they have each met these conditions, 
and are thus aware that this knowledge of one another, 
conditioned by this limited mode of access, ought to be 
treated as privileged information to be transmitted only 
selectively.
By contrast, identification of sexual orientation through SNS 
profile data requires only a connection of any kind arising 
within any context in order to grant access to potentially 
sensitive information. But even without this self-disclosure, 
all contacts from all contexts are welcome in the virtual gay 
bar that may be overlaid on the SNS user’s page and feed. 
A vague work contact, made at a professional conference, 
is invited along to passively overhear conversations within 
communities which he might never have been invited and 
might never have made himself a party to—even if a user, 
for example, posts news of gay marriage legal triumphs and 
vacation pictures with her partner only to a limited “close 
friends” list, her page nonetheless remains a venue in which 
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that our judgment will become impaired by groupthink and 
diffusion of responsibility, and work out ways in which we 
can avoid making poor judgments under that organizational 
influence. Social networks may metaphorically provide that 
more-sober friend who asks “are you sure you’re okay to 
drive?,” enabling our better judgment to gain a foothold. 
Organizations may then have a similar relation to our integrity 
as does our character. Our character is formed by a history 
of actions and interactions, but we may not identify with 
the actions that it brings us to habitually perform. When we 
recognize our vices—e.g., intemperance—and seek to act 
in accordance with our values and beliefs, we act against 
our character and contribute thereby to reforming our habits 
and character to better align with the version of ourselves 
with which we identify. Organizations may similarly bring 
us, through their own form of inertia and habituation, to act 
in ways contrary to our values and beliefs. A confrontation 
with this contradiction through context collapse may help 
us to better recognize the organization’s vices and to act 
according to the version of ourselves, in that organizational 
context, with which we identify—and contribute thereby to 
reforming our organization to better align with our values, 
and with its values as well.
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common view among those who identify as alcoholics is that it is 
a disease and a permanent condition—what is subject to change 
is whether the alcoholic is keeping sober or has relapsed. This 
is where character comes into play—specifically, the hard work 
of (re)gaining and maintaining the virtue of temperance through 
abstemiousness.
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There are, however, significant reasons to believe that, even 
if our lives become ubiquitously subject to surveillance 
and coveillance, this will not result in the exclusion of 
expressions of marginalized identities or unpopular views.14 
First, we see tendencies towards formation of social and 
informational echo chambers, resulting in increasingly 
extreme views rather than an averaging-out to moderate and 
universally accepted views, as Sunstein has argued for and 
documented at length.15 But, secondly, even insofar as we 
do not separate ourselves out into social and informational 
“Daily Me”s becoming a virtual “city of ghettos,” the messy 
and contentious digital spaces in which we are called to 
account for the integration of our multiple selves may tend 
not only towards safe and “lowest-common denominator” 
versions of self-expression, but also towards greater 
visibility and impact of divergent views, and even a new 
impetus away from conformity.16
Thus far we have considered how limiting information 
flows across social and organizational contexts can 
promote integrity, but it is certainly true as well that such 
siloing of different self-performances can support a lack 
of integrity. Compartmentalization is a key tool in allowing 
diffusion of responsibility. The employee who takes an 
“I just work here” perspective in her professional life is 
more likely to encounter productive cognitive dissonance 
when participating in the mixed contexts of SNS in which 
discussions with co-workers about their employer’s actions 
are subject to viewing and commentary by other friends 
who may view a corporate triumph as an environmental 
disaster. The churchgoer who has come to a private peace 
with her personal rejection of some sectarian dogmas may 
be forced into a more vocal and public advocacy by having 
to interact simultaneously with various and divergent 
friends’ reactions to news of court rulings about abortion 
rights.
In these sorts of cases, there is a clear threat to identity 
performances, placing users into precarious positions 
wherein they must defend and attempt to reconcile 
seemingly incompatible group identifications—but this loss 
in the user’s tranquility, in some cases, may bring with it a 
gain in personal integrity and possibilities for organizational 
reform. While it is certainly a bad thing that intermixing 
of audiences may subject users to discrimination, and 
separate performances of identities proper to different 
groups and contexts need not be indicative of a lack of 
integrity, compartmentalization can also enable people to 
act against their own values and stifle productive criticism 
within organizations.
Luban et al. argue forcefully, with reference to the Milgram 
experiment, that bureaucracies create a loss of personal 
responsibility for collective outcomes, resulting in what 
Arendt called “rule by nobody.”17 They suggest that 
we should attempt to maintain adherence to our moral 
values—maintain our integrity in the sense of staying 
true to the version of ourselves with which we identify—
by analogy to how we think of our responsibility for our 
actions when under the influence of alcohol. Just as we 
plan in advance for our impaired judgment later by taking 
a cab to the bar or designating a driver, so too, before we 
enter into an organizational context we should be aware 
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The Moral Roots of Conceptual Confusion 
in Artificial Intelligence Research
Niklas Toivakainen
UNIVERSITY OF HELSINKI
INTRODUCTION
I gather that it would not be an overstatement to claim that 
the field of Artificial Intelligence (AI) research is perceived 
by many to be one of the most fascinating, inspiring, 
hopeful, but also one of the most worrisome and dangerous 
advancements of modern civilization. AI research and 
related fields such as neuroscience promise to replace 
human labor, to make it more efficient, to integrate robotics 
into social realities,1 and to enhance human capabilities. 
To many, AI represents or incarnates an important element 
of a new philosophy of mind, contributing to a revolution 
in our understanding of humans and life in general, which 
is usually integrated with a vision of a new era of human 
and super human intelligence. With such grandiose hopes 
invested in a project it is nut surprising that the same 
elements that invoke hope and enthusiasm in some, 
generate anxiety and disquietude in others.2
While I will have things to say about features of these visions 
and already existing technologies and institutions, the 
main ambition of this paper is to discuss what I understand 
to be a pervasive moral dimension in AI research. To 
make my position clear from the start, I do not mean to 
say that I will discuss AI from a moral perspective, as if 
it could be discussed from other perspectives detached 
from morals. I admit that thinking about morals in terms 
of a “perspective” is natural if one thinks of morality as 
corresponding to a theory about a separable and distinct 
dimension or aspect of human life, and that there are 
other dimensions or aspects, say, scientific reasoning for 
instance, which are essentially amoral or “neutral” with 
respect to morality. Granting that it is a common trait of 
modern analytical philosophy and scientific thinking to 
precisely presuppose such a separation between fact and 
morality (or “value” as it is usually perceived), I am quite 
aware that moral considerations enters into the discussion 
of AI (as is the case for all modern techno-science) as a 
distinct and separate consideration. Nevertheless, I will 
not be concerned here with a critique of moral evaluations 
relevant for AI research—as, for instance, an ethics 
committee would be—but rather with radicalizing the 
relationship between morality and techno-science.3 My 
main claim in this paper will be that the project of AI—as 
the project of any human endeavor—is itself inextricably 
a moral matter. Much of what I will be doing here is to try 
and articulate how this claim makes itself seen on many 
different levels in AI research. This is what I mean by saying 
that I will discuss the moral dimensions of AI.
AI AND TECHNO-SCIENTIFIC UNDERSTANDING 
OF NATURE
The term “Artificial Intelligence” invites three basic 
philosophical—i.e., conceptual—challenges: What is (the 
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